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An Interview with Michael Kantor Services 
"The threat of a presidential veto has been enough to 
kill legislation aimed at taking politics out of legal 
services for the poor. 
A section of pending poverty legislation would have 
established a federally financed but politically independ-
ent National Legal Services Corporation. In an almost 
unnoticed move, the proposal, which passed both houses 
of Congress, was deleted from the 1972 economic 
opportunities bill two weeks ago by a committee of 
Senate-H ... use conferences. 
L & SA How did you get into the job of 
lobbying for the provision to set up an 
independent legal services corporation? 
Kantor I was requested to do so by a number 
of persons representative of legal 
service lawyers' groups, poor peoples' 
groups, and various national bar 
associations, including the ABA, the 
National Bar. 
Action for Legal Rights was created to 
advocate for the establishment of a 
national legal services corporation. 
' ' 
The extraordinary step of abandoning a measure passed 
by both the Senate and House rather than reconciling 
slight differences between Senate and House versions, 
was taken by supporters of the corporation hoping to 
save the bill from its second veto in eight months. 
L & SA Were you the only lobbyist working for 
the provision? 
19 
The result is that the controversial poverty law program 
will remain within the Office of Economic Opportunity, 
where it has been the target of bitter criticism by some 
state governors and by Vice President Spiro T Agnew." 
John P. MacKenzie in Washington 
Post August 26, 1972, p. I. 
Mr. Kantor is a former Legal Services attorney who 
first served the rural poor in South Florida and 
subsequently was Director of Program Development 
Training of Legal Services at the Office of Economic 
Opportunity. When this Administration fired the top 
officials of Legal Services, Mickey became Executive 
Director of Action for Legal Rights to lobby for an 
independent Legal Services Corporation. Since August, 
1972, he has been Staff Co-Ordinator for the Campaign 
of Sargent Shriver. 1
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Kantor Yes. Full time, that is. Of course, we 
had tremendous amounts of help at 
various times, at peak times when the 
bills were on the floor, from persons 
who would take leaves of absences 
from legal services programs, and from 
certain members of the bar. 
L & SA How long did you work on this? 
Kantor I started in January 1971. It carried 
through August of this year when the 
provision was deleted in Conference 
committee. 
L & SA How did you go about lobbying for the 
provision? 
__ ,_,-~-- .... --- ----- --
Kantor I didn't really lobby. I don't think you 
can say that any person representing 
the interests of poor people can lobby, 
because lobbying has the connotation 
that you hav·e some sort of power to 
affect the decisions of a Congressman. 
The AFL-CIO, or the National 
Association of Manufacturers lobby; 
legal services lawyers just advocate. The 
only thing they have is persuasion and 
argument and facts. That's just an 
aside, but l think it is very important. 
We went about it in a way that tried to 
create a sensitivity in the Congress to 
what we thought was a crucial issue, 
that is, the politicization of the legal 
services program. Of course, you've got 
to understand that there were a number 
of people in Congress who were already 
concerned, because of the events of 
1970, about the legal services program, 
and therefore more than ready to begin 
to look at new alternatives. In fact, in 
1970, the President's Commission on 
Executive Organization called for a 
20 private non-profit corporation to 
administer the legal services program, a 
joint informational report of the ABA 
did the same, and so did reports in 
early 1971 by the Young Lawyer's 
Section of the ABA and by the 
National Advisory Committee of Legal 
Services. The idea was legitimized by 
these reports, so therefore the 
momentum really had already begun. 
And, of course the concern and the 
- --
strategy was to take advantage of that 
momentum and try to create a vehicle 
which would truly protect the legal 
services program from political 
incursions. 
L & SA By "the events of 1970," do you mean 
political interference by the Adminis-
tration? 
Kantor Right. Which became clearer and 
clearer ilS we got closer to the 1970 
off-year elections. For instance, on 
June 8, 1970 Frank Carlucci, of the 
---------- -.,,,,,. --
L&SA 
OEO Staff, wrote a memo to Don 
Rumsfeld which began a process of 
change or attempted change to 
regionalize the legal services program, 
i.e. to put the program under the 
political control of persons in the 
various regions of the United States 
who were only subject to the political 
whims and interests of various local 
politicians, and who would J).Ot have 
seen the broad national movement of 
legal services and the recurring patterns 
of problems. In fact, instead of being 
insulated from political pressures, they 
would have been quite subject to them. 
That was the first really large issue in 
1970. During that'regionalization fight 
you had the attempt by the Adminis-
tration to make political issues in the 
1970 off-year elections of the Western 
Center of Law and Poverty in 
California, the Dallas Legal Services 
program, and the New Orleans Legal 
Assistance Corporation. Then came the 
firing after the election of Terry 
Lenzner and Frank Jones, who resisted 
the regionalization and also the use of 
legal services programs as political 
tools. And I call the elephant that 
broke the camel's back California Rural 
Legal Assistance (CRLA) - after 
Governor Reagan vetoed CRLA and 
then OEO failed to override that veto. 
Immediately it was clear that the 
Governor's attack was purely political, 
and later it was proved to be so. 
So your efforts were not to promise 
favors or endorsements, or to convince 
them that it was in their political 
interest, but rather to persuade 
congressmen that the provision was 
needed in the public interest. 
-- -- ----"""' 
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Kantor As innocent as that sounds. We talked 
about a number of things. One was the 
need to keep the executive and 
legislative branches out of the business 
of the judiciary. Second, I argued that 
poor people deserve the same sort of 
viable, effective, independent legal 
services that the more affluent have. 
Three, and probably most important of 
all, I pointed out that the strength of 
---------_. - - ._.. our institutions in an adversary society 
depends upon everyone having a right 
of access and advocacy with regard to 
the decisions which are being made 
which affect their lives. And those ideas 
were saleable and did sell not only to 
what we might call the liberals in both 
parties but to some very interesting 
conservatives. After all, those 
sentiments are impeccably conservative, 
and I think that the most gratifying 
part of this is that a number of 
congressmen whom I think should be 
praised, looked at this program and 
said, ''This is what we should be doing, 
whether I agree with the other social 
programs under the Johnson Adminis-
tration or not. This program has been 
effective and it strengthens our 
institutions and it brings people into 
the system." 
L & SA Then why was the provision defeated? 
Kantor The Administration, purely and simply. 
Interestingly enough, you know we 
passed the House three times and the 
Senate three times. We were never 
defeated on a roll-call vote in either 
body on any subject with regard to 
legal services for eighteen months. What 
happened of course is that people on 
the White House staff decided for 
ideological and political reasons that 
they did not want legal services in an 
independent environment. I am very 
concerned that their plan for legal 
services is to emasculate the program if 
they win on November 7. I don't know 
what other conclusion you can draw. 
We were subject to the veto on 
December 9, 1971. The only reason the 
Senate Committee deleted that [legal 
services] provision was because the 
Administration said, "We will veto the 
OEO bill if an independent legal 
services corporation is a part of it." 
L & SA Were there any particular people in the 
Administration who were on either 
side? 
............... -------- -- ._-
Kantor No one ever surfaced in the Administra-
tion in favor of the provision. I can tell 
you who actively lobbied against it. 
First of all, the incredible situation is 
that OEO, supposedly the advocate of 
poor people, lobbied against the legal 
services corporation, which was 
supported by every poor peoples' group 
who ever spoke up about it. That's 
number one. Then in the White House 
you have a whole cadre of White House 
lobbyists and White House power lined 
up in the face of this provision. But 
even in the face of that the Congress 
exercised its independent judgment on 
six different occasions and passed the 
provision. What is disturbing of course 
is that the power of the presidency is so 
strong that they can threaten veto and 
have this bill struck from the extension 
of the Economic Opportunity Act. 
I'm still amazed or maybe I'm just 
naive; never once, no matter who the 
Congressman was or what side he took, 
did anyone refer to any great extent to 
the effects his decision would have in 
his prospects for re-election, one way 
or the other. Now maybe they did it 
out of my earshot, and maybe they did 
it and it wasn't reported to me, but it 
seems to me that the greatest concern 
was with philosophy, with the effect of 
the program on the public good. Yet, 
with the Administration on the other 
hand it was all political; it never got 
into substance; they couldn't have 
cared less about the substance. Maybe 
someday I'll go off and think about the 
executive: is that the way it is, or is this 
just a passing phase due to the 
peculiarities of this Administration? If 
it's not an aberration, then I think we 
have to seriously rethink about the 
powers of the executive branch. 
"OEO lobbied against the legal service corporation which 
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L & SA Were there any other people who took 
an active part in this beside you and the 
Administration? What was the position 
of the ABA, for instance? 
Kantor The ABA up until December, 1971, 
remained neutral with regard to the 
political fight. The political fight with a 
little "p" was the bi partisan bill, which 
we supported, as against the bill 
sponsored by the Administration. The 
ABA had come out early for a 
corporation and they had set certain 
criteria [essentially concerning 
management control] which were 
much more consistent with the 
bi-partisan bill. Individuals in the ABA 
criticized the Administration bill quite 
loudly. What happened, though, in late 
November in 1971, was that once the 
Conference Committee of the House 
and Senate decided on one bill then 
Leon Jaworski, President of the ABA, 
sent a letter to every member of 
Congress supporting that bill. From 
that point on the ABA actively 
supported the bills we supported. 
L & SA Who threw in the towel in the 
Conference Committee then? 
Kantor Signals were put out by the Administra-
tion. Very direct signals, through their 
spokesmen on the Hill. They were Al 
Quie on the House side, who you know 
is the senior minority member of the 
House Education and Labor Commit-
tee, and through Bob Taft, who is the 
Senator from Ohio. The signal was that 
unless that Board was completely 
controlled by the President of the 
United States there would be no 
corporation; he would veto any bill 
that was sent to him without that. 
Senators Javits and Nelson decided that 
they would acqu.iese to that position 
and go with an all-presidentially 
appointed board with no criteria and 
with no input from any other group. 
The legal services actvocates on that 
Conference with our acquiescence and 
active help decided it would be better 
to have no corporation at all than to 
have one which was not independent 
yet insulated from public scrutiny and 
accountability. So that's really what it 
came down to. The issue was joined in 
August. I would hasten to say though 
that Nelson and Javits are great friends 
of the legal service corporation. It was 
their honest judgment that we were 
.... --- -- -.... _ ,. - .... -- --._ - - --
better off with any kind of corporation 
than OEO. It was a matter of judgment. 
It was the judgment of the majority of 
the conferees, and the legal services 
people, and bar people that we couldn't 
afford to get into an institution that 
was going to have to survive X number 
of years but wasn't truly independent, 
that we were better off staying in OEO, 
fighting the bureacracy there and 
waiting until the next Congress. 
It was our first choice that we ought to 
give the President the bill even if he 
would veto it. Number one, in hopes 
that maybe there was a 5% chance he 
would sign it. But number two, why 
should our friends, Democrat and 
Republican, veto the bill for him? We 
thought it would sensitize the public 
more than they are now to the issue. 
And it would make the legal profession 
more aware of the problem. It was my 
judgment that that would be very good 
for the legal services program. You 
know, the legal services program is such 
that when we've had political problems 
we've won every time they've been 
public. Where we get beat is in the back 
rooms. We can't afford to have these 
issues determined in the back rooms. 
Our only power is the power of public 
information, public knowledge, 
newspapers and media looking at these 
issues and exploring them. Once we get 
into a situation where there is no public 
scrutiny, we're going to get beaten, 
because as I said before we have no 
power to effect our interests. 
L & SA So you are a lobbyist who tries to get 
things out in the open. 
Kantor That's right. 
L & SA How did you go about doing that? Did 
you work with the media a lot? 
Kantor To some degree, yes. We tried with 
some success, although let's be honest, 
this is not the biggest issue in America 
- I think it's a hell of an important 
program, but it is certainly nothing like 
tax reform or the war in Vietnam. Our 
initial step was that legal services 
"It was our first choice that 
we give the President the bill 
even if he would veto it." 
·- - --
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lawyers raised money for me, and I 
travelled all around the country and 
met with all kinds of people trying to 
get them to sensitize local jurisdictions 
to bubble up support. It seemed to us, 
and I think it proved to be fai1ly true, 
that this is not a Washington issue and 
never should be. The legal service 
programs operate in local jurisdictions 
with local boards of directors with their 
own local priorities. So, therefore, 
that's where the ideas and the emphl).sis 
and the support should bubble up 
from. If there was any broad strategy in 
terms of the politics, if there are any in 
dealing with poor people - they're so 
powerless it may be a misnomer to say 
that there is some sort of politics 
here-I think maybe there is some sort 
of moral persuasion involved, and it 
should bubble up. And this was not just 
ideological. I think it was also strategic. 
It was much more effective that 
Congressman X from Ohio heard from 
poor people and civil rights groups and 
church groups and the League of 
Women Voters in his home town, than 
to have him hear from Mickey Kantor 
running around the Hill, who may or 
may not be representing anyone. You 
know, it's obvious if you work for the 
National Association of Manufacturers 
that you have some impramateur to go 
in and talk to Congressman X and talk 
about various problems and you have 
some power to effect your interests. 
But with legal services I think what had 
to happen was that the interest had to 
bubble up and then I and others had to 
carry the message and work with the 
various Congressmen in writing sections 
of the bill. I worked with Republicans 
and Democrats, liberals and conserva-
tives, and so on. 
L & SA How did you get this interest to bubble 
up? 
Kantor We set up regional action committees in 
every OEO region, and they were 
composed of legal services lawyers, bar 
people, poor people, working together 
to try to work on media, work on 
groups like labor unions, other kinds of 
constituencies in order to begin to 
sensitize their Senator and Congress-
man to the issue. 
L & SA And you found that to be effective? 
- --
____ .. _...., __ 
- -- .... - ---
Kantor Not I 00%. I certainly thi.nk that it 
helped a lot. You know, a lot of the 
most effective lobbying for poor people 
is done by members of Congress, by 
Fritz Mondale, by Alan Cranston, by 
Bill Ford, by Ted Kennedy. Button-
holing their colleagues and talking 
about these issues is probably the most 
effective lobbying of all, or legislative 
advocacy. Therefore, I worked through 
people like that. So that what you have 
was maybe what you would call a 
pincer movement, bubbling up from 
the grass roots and efforts by collegues, 
and in the end doing something that no 
one thought we could do-pass that 
kind of bill, and a very good bill, and 
pass it six times. 
L & SA Did you have any amusing encounters 
with people on the other side? 
Kantor I guess you should see humor in 
everything, but none of it was very 
amusing. You know, it bothers me that 
these people have no appreciation for 
the rights of prop le to have access to 
courts. They really are the most 
arrogant people I have ever dealt with 
in my life. 
L& SA Who? 
Kantor The Administration people. I guess 
hubris is the only word I can think of. 
It's an arrogance of power. They really 
think in their paternalistic way that 
they know what's best for the country, 
and they don't really care if anyone 
else has any input. And that especially 
goes for poor people, who don't vote 
for Republicans, anyway. Also, it's 
more than ideological; a lot of it is 
racial. I didn't find much humor in 
dealing with them. But on the other 
hand I have nothing but admiration for 
the people, Republicans and Demo-
crats, with whom we dealt in Congress. 
It's incredible to me-the arrogance of 
the White House bureaucrat as 
compared with the gentlemanly 
conduct, the honesty of the elected 
officials on the Hill. I guess I'm very 
naive, but that was the most stark 
contrast to me-the people on the Hill, 
some in particular, are generally bright, 
effective and honest. I would not say 
that about the people from the White 
House. And I think this can be 
confirmed on the issues that other 
people are concerned with. My 
...... - -- .... ...._ 
23 
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----.. ---- _ _, ---
counterparts in the child development 
movement, for example, would say the 
same thing. 
L&SA Let's talk about those people for a 
minute. Is there a new breed of public 
interest Job byist? 
Kantor Yes. 
L&SA Who employs them? 
Kantor Well, let's take me for instance. It's 
very interesting-every penny, and it 
wasn't much, that I got paid during 
that year and a half, it paid for my 
travel around the country, too, came 
out of the pockets of lawyers and some 
from poor people. Three people gave 
me contributions of $100-totally 
unsolicited. The rest came in from $1 
to $25. We raised $22-23,000 in that 
eighteen month period, which I think is 
damn good on an issue like this. 
L&SA How did you do that? 
Kantor We tried to get people to give us lists of 
people, and we wrote letters. We raised 
some money at rallies after Terry 
[Lenzner] and Frank [Jones] were 
fired. So we had some seed money, 
$3600 or so. That's how it started. 
L&SA Do these other public interest lobbyists 
get their money from such decentral-
ized sour~es? 
Kantor Some get them from unions, some from 
private contributions, some from 
particular wealthy people who want to 
see certain issues carried. There is a 
variety of sources. The problem, of 
course, is that the biggest source of all 
is unavailable, the foundations. 
Foundation money is not available for 
legislative advocacy. 
24 L&SA Do these other public interest lawyers 
who do not work only for poor people 
have a broader choice of tactics than 
you? 
Kantor The enviromentalists do, and the 
consumer groups do. The reason is that 
they have much more power. They are 
dealing with middle class people, who 
have influence of their own plus greater 
numbers of active people. You know, 
--- -,,, ~ ... _______ , ...... __ ...... .- -
poor people are not as politically 
sensitized because they don't have time 
to be; they are scratching to make a 
living and to exist. So therefore that is 
a much more effective lobby in the 
traditional sense, although they are not 
traditional in the issues they take up. 
L&SA Other than issues, how are they 
different from the heavies in the 
Thomas Nast cartoons? 
Kantor Well, they're very different in the sense 
that they never threaten political 
reprisals. That's just not in their book 
of strategies. They try to hit the issues 
and hit the issues hard. They try to use 
the media. I think really what has 
happened is that newspapers and the 
electronic media are doing what they 
should be doing and that is acting as 
public ombudsmen in this country. 
And the public interest lobby, 
especially the environmental and 
consumer groups who I think have 
done a good job, have used them in 
that way and I think they should. 
'Used" in the best sense of the word; I 
don't mean manipulate. I mean using 
that forum to discuss issues which were 
heretofore not discussed. And that has 
an effect on the Congress. They also 
use the same strategy we used trying to 
bubble up support, which they find 
very effective. And we work with each 
other quite a bit and try to help out. 
They have been very, very good to legal 
services. Consumer and environmental 
groups, whose interests really aren't 
tied to poor people, decided to help us 
out, because we needed it and because 
they believed in what we were trying to 
do. And they expended resources on 
us, which I think is quite unusual. 
L&SA Do you work closely with more 
traditional lobbyists? 
Kantor: You know, there were 93 groups in the 
coalition to save legal services. Those 
93 groups run the gamut, from B'Nai 
Brith, to the AFL-CIO, to the National 
Welfare Rights Association, to the 
League of Women Voters, to the 
United Auto Workers. to the National 
Catholic Conference. 
L& SA Did you put this coalition together? 
Kantor: No, it was started by the League of 
Women Voters and other groups. And 
at first they weren't concerned about 
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"It's incredible to me the arrogance of the White House 
bureaucrat as compared with the gentlemanly conduct of 
the elected officials on the Hill." 
the legal seivices bill. We had put our Kantor I think number one, other than the 
own coalition together in around April philosophy and my ideology, is the 
1971. It was a loose alliance in the kind of people that you deal with. 
sense that they were really concentrat- Legal services is what I've always done. 
ing on other OEO programs. When legal I was a public interest lobbyist because 
services was the issue of the week, we of my concern for legal services; it 
all got together. didn't go the other way around. I 
wasn't a public interest lobbyist that 
L&SA You don't feel that your provision was found an issue. I've been in every level 
deleted so that other parts of the of legal services since I got out of law 
coalition might secure their programs? school. So there's a philosophy and 
ideology there, a concern for our 
Kantor: There was probably some pressure that system of justice or lack thereof, a 
way. But I have a feeling they resisted concern that we ought to be confront-
it. Obviously, there was pressure the ing injustice in legal services. But one of 
whole way to trade off legal services for the things that hits you personally is 
the rest of the bill. In the end, that's to the caliber of people that you deal 
some degree what happened with with, that you are allied with-they are 
Nelson and Javits - they did not want humane, bright, committed people, 
this bill vetoed. You know, it's whose concerns run not to material 
interesting, in 1969 in the fight over things but to issues. And that to me 
the Green amendment in the House and was my high water mark in my time 
then in 1971 in another incident in the with legal services. I consider them the 
House, Legal Services could have traded real heroes of this country now, people 
off OEO for our betterment and we like Jim Lorenz and Gary Bellows, who 
didn't. Not that we're heroes, because were at CRLA. People who weren't out 
no has ever done that in the coalition, in the streets-although I'm not 
to my knowledge. And hopefully it will criticizing people in the anti-war 
never happen. It's always been a solid movement-people who went from civil 
front. There have been cracks and ' rights to poverty and worked their cans 
people have weakened, but they have off and were effective. I think that all 
come back into the fold. of us in this country have got to quit 
throwing rocks for the sake of throwing 
I'd like to say one thing about the rocks and have got to begin to start 
unions in particular. The unions have hitting something. We've got to begin 
been fantastic in helping us. You know, to make changes, because 1 think a lot 
as much as we might concern ourselves of people are turned off. What we've 
about the power of the unions and the done is either have huge demonstra-
abuse of that power sometimes, they tions or a lot of rhetoric and absolutely 
took on issues like legal services and no change whatsoever. People like 
their members aren't that affected by Lorenz and Bellows and Cliff Sweet in 
it. But they took it on effectively ... Oakland and legal services offices all 
and I think sometimes we're too over the country are trying to effect 
cynical, especially about labor unions. reasonable, logical, necessary change. 
Kenny Young of the AFL and CIO was 
especially helpful. He spent hours and L&SA But in your role as a lobbyist you are 
hours helping us. quite dependent on the will of the 
majority. There's no judicial short-cut 
L&SA What are the satisfactions of being a 
to take. That must at times be quite 
public interest lobbyist? 
constraining and frustrating. 
Kantor: It's much more difficult than litigation. 
because it's much more sophisticated. 
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, ___ .......... 
26 
,_ --... .... -- ,, 
currents and cross-currents and there 
are no set rules in this. Litigation is not 
easy, and it is sophisticated too in its 
way, but working through the Hill 
you've got political concerns and 
you've got substantive concerns and 
you've got constituent concerns. You 
have all sorts of cross-currents affecting 
the issues that you are dealing with. It's 
frustrating, but it's satisfying, too. You 
know what happens with litigation is 
that the issues become so narrow by 
the time you appeal that you never end 
up with exactly what you wanted, 
either in terms of your client or the 
broader issue. But if you can make the 
change in the legislative arena, it's 
much more effective, much more 
cost-effective. Even this whole battle, 
with vetoes and all took a year and a 
half, and we almost won it and we were 
talking about a program which would 
have added another $80 million to legal 
services, which would have put it in an 
independent setting and which would 
have expanded it greatly both in terms 
of volume and substance. It's a 
high-gain, high-risk forum, much more 
than the courts. 
L & SA Is the effort to set up an independent 
corporation dead now? 
Kantor No. It will be revived. A lot depends on 
the election. I think the program is in 
trouble in OEO after November 7. I 
think we can pass the Congress anytime 
we want to. The problem is the 
Administration. Of course, if Mr. Nixon 
is re-elected and they are a lame-duck 
administration. I don't know if there is 
any prospect of getting him to sign a 
relevant, independent legal services bill. 
The thing that hits me after you step 
back and look at the larger issue, is the 
consistent pattern of the Administra-
tion to try to tinker with our system of 
justice, to make it more politically 
sensitive, which is just heinous. Here is 
Richard Nixon, the first lawyer 
president we've had in quite a while, 
who seems to have no appreciation for 
the need for an independent judiciary, 
the need for independent lawyers, the 
need to allow everyone equal access to 
the system of justice. We see that his 
rhetoric of wan ting to strengthen our 
institutions is hypocritical, because the 
way to strengthen our institutions is to 












' ' ' 
them work is to allow people to 
participate in them. And that to me is 
the most disturbing part of this whole 
thing; it constantly comes back, 
whether it's Supreme Court appoint-
ments, or the role or lack thereof of 
our Justice Department the legal 
services program, the I.T.T. affair. You 
put all this together and you come out 
with a very insensitive, arrogant use of 
power. And I think to you and I, as 
people in this profession, it's something 
to be very frightened of, the manipula-
tion of the machinery of justice by the 
Administration. I think we ought to be 
thinking about how to insulate the 
Justice Department and the judicial 
system even further from the legislative 
and executive branches. I see that as a 
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